Introduction
An opaque global market for highly complex, securitized derivatives, the concentration of risk in a small handful of enormously powerful private actors, financial institutions deemed "too big to fail" and backstopped by public authorities, and questions about the adequacy of risk models and capital holdings -all of these phenomena have been criticized as contributing to the 2008 global financial crisis. The regulatory proposals that came out of the G-20 meetings during the crisis and its immediate aftermath targeted many of these aspects of global financial markets, recognizing the salience of systemic risk and the need to regulate financial markets at the level of networks, rather than institutions. A key element of these regulatory proposals was a call for non-exchange-traded derivatives to be "cleared" through intermediaries that would act as a single counterparty to both the buy-side and the sell-side, reducing counterparty risk and, in combination with new disclosure requirements, rendering the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market and its complex dynamics of risk more legible, tractable, and, ideally, manageable. Six years after the G-20's call for central clearing, the proposal has been implemented in the majority of the main financial centers.
1 By 2016, 62% of all OTC contracts were conducted through central counterparties (CCPs), and the Bank for International Settlements estimated that the rate of clearing for interest rate derivatives had more than doubled (and perhaps even tripled) between 2008 and 2016 as a result of the clearing mandate.
2
Central clearing is one of the most significant post-crisis regulatory changes to a market that was, prior to the global financial crisis, notable for its nearly complete lack of public regulation and oversight. Nonetheless, the clearing requirement has been met with a series of What accounts for the recalcitrance of the OTC derivatives market to this regulatory change? Why has a key regulatory mandate, specifically intended to counteract the risk associated with waves of defaults in a highly complex network, ended up reproducing some of the same dynamics? I argue that focusing on the technologies and practices used to govern derivatives markets helps explain the absence of more radical regulatory policy shifts in 1 As of June 2016, the central clearing mandate had been implemented for at least some categories of derivatives in Australia, China, the European Union, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, and the United States (Financial Stability Board, 2016: 22) . 2 Bank for International Settlements, 2016a: 22-23. derivatives regulation. Specifically, I contend that although there has been a significant shift in who regulates OTC markets, much less has changed at the level of the specific practices that govern these markets. 3 CCPs are much more important players in the OTC market now than they were prior to the crisis and they have changed the structure of trading in significant ways.
Nonetheless, the tools they use to manage the risk of counterparty default are quite similar to those cited by key regulatory authorities prior to the crisis as guaranteeing the markets' capacity to govern itself. While these tools may be reasonably well-suited to organize and manage markets during ordinary times, their inadequacy during times of crisis, when complexity and uncertainty dominate over the regularities on which most risk management tools are premised, has already been demonstrated.
Once we look beyond the shift from private to public regulation embodied in the central clearing mandate, central clearing can be seen as a compelling illustration of two of the major themes of this volume, as set out in the introductory chapter by Helleiner, Pagliari, and Spagna:
continuity where we might expect to see change; and fragmented implementation where cooperation and coordination would seem to be essential. While the persistent influence of a transnational community of public-and private-sector actors who imagine, endorse, and mandate key regulatory tools helps explain continuity in technologies of market governance, fragmentation in central clearing owes much to the enduring (or perhaps resurgent) significance of national level regulatory actors. Taken together, continuity at the level of practices and 3 The issues associated with central clearing go beyond the continued reliance on pre-crisis risk management practices. For example, some commentators have pointed to possible conflicts of interest between CCPs and their members, whereby CCPs may relax collateral requirements to attract more end users, undermining their capacity to manage systemic risk by containing losses associated with counterparty default (Yagiz, 2014) . However, I focus primarily on the former issue in this chapter to more specifically address the central question of continuity that motivates this volume.
fragmentation among national jurisdictions helps account for the unexpected reproduction of potentially crisis-prone financial market dynamics -another theme introduced by Helleiner, Pagliai, and Spagna.
This rest of this paper proceeds in five parts. First, I position my analysis in contrast to public and scholarly claims that the central clearing mandate should be understood primarily as a major shift in the regulatory landscape and a promising solution to the problem of counterparty and systemic risk, arguing that such a perspective overlooks important continuities in financial market governance. Next, I provide some context for the post-crisis clearing requirement, paying particular attention to a set of practices (netting, collateralization, and risk modeling/management) that structured the market for OTC derivatives prior to the crisis -and that were taken by regulators as evidence of the market's capacity to regulate itself. Third, I
briefly describe how the OTC market was implicated in the financial crisis and how central clearing emerged as a hallmark policy proposal. Fourth, I sketch out some of the unintended consequences of central clearing, focusing on those that reproduce pre-crisis dynamics. The final section analyzes these changes, emphasizing the continuities in the market for OTC derivatives that have persisted despite a significant regulatory change.
Tempering the optimism of central clearing optimists
The clearing mandate represents something of a hard case for the argument that postcrisis derivatives regulation is better characterized in terms of continuity rather than change. The rapid and widely shared consensus among international and national policymakers that most OTC derivatives should be centrally cleared represents, in some ways, a significant departure from the pre-crisis regulatory environment. Helleiner and Pagliari, 2010: 74. from private to public regulation, the consequences of central clearing are better understood as reflecting continuity at the level of practice. In structuring the OTC market, these practices also delimit thinking about the techniques of market governance.
Pre-Crisis Practices of Self-Regulation
Against the backdrop of the end of the Bretton Woods system, the liberalization of capital controls, the development of deep, liquid, and minimally regulated global capital markets, a global market in non-exchange-traded derivatives based on interest rates, exchange rates, and credit risk began to develop in the 1980s. 26 Over-the-counter derivatives have historically been bilaterally traded, orchestrated through standardized, nationally enforceable contracts with each party to the contract potentially vulnerable to the risk of default by her counterparty (known as credit risk). Market participants took a series of measures to limit their exposures to counterparty default, most notably through netting arrangements, collateralization, and risk modeling. Prior to the financial crisis, these practices were cited by regulatory authorities as evidence of the market's capacity to regulate itself.
Legitimizing self-regulation
26 Some commodity derivatives are also traded over-the-counter, but the bulk of the OTC market is made up of interest rate, foreign exchange, and credit derivatives. that "derivatives market participants seem keenly aware of the counterparty credit risks associated with derivatives and take various measures to mitigate those risks," noting that, "market participants usually have strong incentives to monitor and control the risk they assume in choosing to deal with particular counterparties. In essence, prudential regulation is supplied by the market through counterparty evaluation and monitoring rather than by [public] authorities."
29
While perhaps most vocally championed in the United States, this anti-regulatory attitude was shared by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, the main international public actor to take up the issue of transnational market regulation, whose recommendations for national 27 Greenspan, 2003: 2. 28 Ibid., 3-4. 29 Ibid., 5.
the financial sector.
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The self-regulation of OTC markets prior to the crisis, in general, did not occur over public regulators' objections but was rather endorsed and enabled by a shared worldview that held that efficiency and liquidity in the market were both normatively desirable and best ensured through minimal state intervention. The close relationship between the financial industry and state economies, especially in terms of extending credit to individuals and the use of finance as a growth strategy, meant that the financial industry's interests and public economic authorities'
interests were often interpreted and represented as converging. As Kwak notes, "it is difficult to prove that the deregulatory policies pursued by these agencies were clearly not in the public interest as knowable at the time."
32
Prior to the crisis, the risk of counterparty default was addressed through a series of conventional industry practices, rooted in private authority, most notably the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, an industry coordinating and lobbying group. ISDA provided parties to derivatives deals a standardized contract known as the Master Agreement that could be modified to fit the specifics of individual derivative dealings. Although the Master Agreement did not provide all the same functions as a formal, publically regulated derivatives exchange, which limits counterparty credit risk through the use of daily margin calls, the widespread use of 30 Tsingou, 2006 : 177. 31 Zimmermann, 2010 . 32 Kwak, 2013: 73. the Master Agreement nonetheless fostered standardization and comparability of contracts, facilitating market liquidity. 
Netting
The Master Agreement also played a critical role in legitimizing self-regulation, mitigating regulators' concerns about the concentration of counterparty risk in a handful of derivative dealer banks by outlining provisions for terminating contracts in the event of counterparty default, most notably permitting parties to "net out" all of their open transactions with each other, rather than undertaking a series of payments back and forth that the defaulting party might not be able to complete. 34 The practice of netting thus reduces one firm's exposure to its counterparty. The use of these closeout netting agreements was endorsed by the Basel Supervisory Committee in 1994, which noted that "netting arrangements for […] forward-value contractual commitments such as foreign exchange contracts and swaps have the potential to improve both the efficiency and the stability of interbank settlements, by not only reducing costs but also credit and liquidity risks" 35 and amended the 1988 Capital Accord to permit bilateral netting. 36 The netting provision was also lauded by national regulators as an example of marketbased initiatives to reduce counter-party risk. As Darryll Hendricks of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York concluded in 1994, "netting agreements unequivocally lead to reductions in current 33 ISDA estimated that by 2003, there were more than 54,000 signed bilateral derivatives contracts using the Master Agreement form (cited in Riles, 2011: 75) . 34 Zepeda, 2014 35 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1994: 7. 36 The 1988 Capital Accord had previously only permitted netting by novation, which replaced existing contracts between two counterparties for delivery of a specified amount of currency on a specified date by a single contract that took into account all of the original contracts.
credit exposures, which make up the bulk of total credit exposures [and] under certain circumstances, netting agreements reduce fluctuations in the volatility of the credit exposures of dealer institutions, thereby lowering the volatility of the institutions' credit exposures on average … the second major components of total credit exposures to OTC derivatives." 37
Collateralization
A second practice facilitated by the Master Agreement was the assignment of collateral to derivatives contracts, intended to reduce the risk of large losses in the event of counterparty default. As ISDA writes, "In the case of a privately negotiated derivatives transaction, the essential mechanism by which collateralization works is to provide an asset of value that is to the side of the primary transaction; in the event of default on the primary transaction, the collateral receiver has recourse to the collateral asset and can thus indirectly make good any loss Greenspan, 2005 . It should be noted, however, that Greenspan conceded that collateralization is less effective when counterparties hold very large positions in highly illiquid markets (e.g., Long Term Capital Management in 1998), when closing out contracts may move markets, amplifying losses beyond the posted amount of collateral. For further references to the significance of collateral to self-regulation see: Behof, 1993: 21-31 and Greenspan, 1997: "Institutional participants in the off-exchange markets also have demonstrated their ability to manage credit risks quite effectively through careful evaluation of counterparties, the setting of internal credit limits, and the judicious use of netting agreements and collateral … Thus, there appears to be no need for government regulation of offexchange derivative transactions between institutional counterparties." 42 Riles, 2011: 44. particularly important role in the market for credit derivatives, contracts used to insure (or hedge) against the risk of default (the credit risk) attached to an underlying portfolio of assets.
43
In addition to external measures of risk, derivatives market participants relied on internal (though broadly standardized) risk models, taking the risk of default into account. These were in turn tied to internal bank risk limits and capital requirements, as recommended by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in the 1988 Capital Accord, which focused on credit risk, and its 1996 Amendment covering market risk. Banks were required to keep specified amounts of capital to guard against unexpected losses, with the precise amount determined through a combination of risk-weighted assets and models of market risk exposure. These models played an instrumental role in empowering derivatives traders as authoritative, responsible managers of the financial future. 44 But while the use of technical risk models was perceived as a marker of the industry's ability to effectively govern itself, this view masked considerable disagreement over the content of these models, including the underlying distribution of returns assumed by the model, the strategy for calibration, and the appropriate parameter values. The challenges associated with pricing counterparty risk were amplified for derivative products containing multiple pooled securities. Determining the correlation between default probabilities for assets within a tranched product posed a particularly complex challenge, and while David Li's Gaussian copula function was seized on by investors to price and sell collateralized debt obligations, it was not without its (prescient) critics. Quants like Paul Wilmott and Jon Gregory rightly questioned its underlying assumption that credit default swap markets can accurately price default risk and its reliance on a short window of historical data. 45 But technical 43 Partnoy, 2006: 73-80 . 44 Lockwood, 2015 . 45 Madigan, 2008; Salmon, 2009. disagreements like these did not rise to the level of bank managers, let alone regulators, and like netting, collateralization, and credit rating, risk modeling -in conjunction with risk limits and capital requirements -was widely interpreted to be a sound private-sector method of governing the future. 46 In conjunction with risk limits and stress testing, risk model-based capital requirements reassured regulators that the OTC markets should have the authority to govern themselves.
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The pre-crisis OTC derivatives market was governed primarily through private industry practices that served to convince and reassure regulators that market actors had the necessary capability to govern themselves and to limit the potential crisis. Statements from the Fed chair and governors, the Bank of England, and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision suggest that key regulators saw an unregulated OTC market as serving the public good, further forestalling the potential for more intrusive regulatory policies. 
Financial crisis and the origins of the clearing requirement
Despite private-and public-sector confidence in private forms of risk management, their inadequacy was starkly revealed during the 2008 financial crisis, when waves of defaults by insufficiently collateralized counterparties spread through the derivatives market, hastened by 46 Porter, 2010: 62-64. 47 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1996: 1; Alan Greenspan, 1999 : "Some may now argue that the periodic emergence of financial panics implies a need to abandon models-based approaches to regulatory capital and to return to traditional approaches based on regulatory risk measurement schemes. In my view, however, this would be a major mistake. Regulatory risk measurement schemes are simpler and much less accurate than banks' risk measurement models." 48 Market efficiency, wealth creation, and distribution of risk are all variously cited as public ends served by derivatives.
private contracts was recognized as overly complex and severely lacking in transparency, as contracts were unwound rapidly and without sufficient liquidity in the system to ensure full repayment or to accurately price the contracts counterparties had on their books. As losses dramatically exceeded those anticipated by risk models, capital cushions were quickly exhausted and bilateral netting and collateralization arrangements were insufficient to confine losses associated with counterparty default to the immediate parties to the contract. 59 The clearing requirement has increased the percentage of cleared OTC contracts, but it has been less successful at restructuring financial markets to make them less crisis-prone.
The unintended (but familiar) consequences of central clearing

Regulatory and market fragmentation
While ostensibly a move by public regulators to reclaim a measure of control over financial markets, the central clearing requirements have struggled to do just that. Rather than centralizing a market formerly seen as overly complex and decentralized, central clearing requirements have produced regulatory fragmentation, as different jurisdictions have imposed different clearing requirements on different timelines, raising questions about liquidity and the concentration of risk in the global market for derivatives. 60 While nearly two-thirds of the total volume of OTC derivatives contracts is cleared, the clearing rate is much lower for credit derivatives (37%) and foreign exchange and equity derivatives (>2%). 61 There is also considerable variation in clearing rate across national lines. Although multilateral netting and collateralization are intended to offset the concentration of risk in CCPs, the possibility of CCPs having inadequate capital reserves is not farfetched.
Too-big-to-fail, scaled up
Analysts and market observers have raised questions about the ability of CCPs to effectively mitigate systemic risk. For example, ISDA's chair Stephen O'Connor recently remarked that the two major clearinghouses, LCH.Clearnet and CME "probably" have enough capital on hand in case of widespread default of their members, which many observers found less than reassuring.
69
The head of global clearing at JPMorgan is similarly concerned about the ability of CCPs to limit losses and forestall crises, locating the responsibility for doing so squarely within the financial industry: "The CCP default fund contribution is woefully inadequate. The CCPs only pay 2%
66 Pirrong, 2011: 14. 67 LCH.Clearnet, for example, clears around half of all the world's OTC derivatives (Hodgson, 2014) . 68 Powell, 2014. 69 Rennison, 2014. towards that fund at the moment, and that contribution needs to increase, because we have to rule out the taxpayer picking up the cost. The industry needs to be able to shoulder this burden, and the ring-fencing of losses is vitally important. 
Still-unregulated markets
Finally, some commentators have observed that large volumes of trading do not even qualify for central clearing. Not all OTC derivatives have large enough trading volumes to ensure the liquidity necessary for centralized clearing and are exempted from the clearing requirements of Dodd-Frank and EMIR, although under post-crisis regulation, many OTC derivatives that are not subject to the clearing requirement are subject to higher margin requirements than before. Perhaps more significantly, so-called dark pools of capital continue to be unregulated at the public level at all.
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6. Making sense of the unintended consequences
A reversal of regulatory fortune or crisis-prone continuity?
The shift in regulatory thinking from viewing derivatives as an area in which states' regulatory power should accommodate the power of global capital to a view shared by influential regulators in the EU and US that the market for derivatives is an appropriate object of at least some measure of state control is a significant one. Nonetheless, state actors have struggled to assert control over a sphere of social interaction that is constituted by innovation, uncertainty, and adaptability. Having legitimized these forms of un-publically governed social activity in the 78 See, for example: Biedermann, 2015. 1990s and early 2000s, recent attempts to put the genie back in the bottle have touched off new dynamics of complex interconnectedness and uncertainty.
What accounts for these consequences and the return of concerns about risk modeling, too-big-to-fail, liquidity, and uncertainty? I contend that while the central clearing requirement undoubtedly marks a shift in thinking about which actors have the authority to regulate OTC markets, it is also characterized by considerable continuity at the level of practices and that adhering to these practices limits policymakers' ability to envision more radical regulatory reforms that might have the potential to more radically restructure global financial markets.
Although large volumes of OTC contracts are now cleared through CCPs, the practices used to manage risk are remarkably similar to the ones that were used prior to 2008 and that both industry and regulatory actors alike recognized as inadequate. Central clearing has reshaped the market, but it has done little to fundamentally alter its unpredictable dynamics. On this point, Fed
Governor Jerome Powell is worth quoting at some length:
It has also been frequently observed that central clearing simplifies and makes the financial system more transparent. That, too, has an element of truth to it, but let's take a closer look. Charts […] are frequently offered to illustrate the point that, as a CCP becomes a buyer to every seller and a seller to every buyer, it causes risks to be netted and simplifies the network of counterparties. The dizzying and opaque constellation of exposures that exists in a purely bilateral market, […] is replaced by a neat hub-and-spoke network that is both known and more Powell's analysis suggests that CCPs operate in a world that is, in some ways, just as complex, uncertain, and crisis-prone as the pre-crisis world, not because CCPs have left relationships between financial institutions untouched but because they have replicated some of them at a different scale. Moreover, as clearinghouses rely on many of the same risk management practices that failed in the financial crisis, we should question the extent to which they have successfully mitigated systemic risk.
Three practices, in particular, are commonly cited in regulatory documents as contributing to CCPs' superior capacity to manage credit and systemic risk in OTC markets:
netting, collateralization, and risk management systems. Ironically, these are the same practices that public regulators prior to the crisis referenced in their defenses of market self-regulation prior to the crisis. The IMF's description of the merits of central clearing is illustrative of many public sector actors' endorsement of this regulatory change: "the primary advantage of a CCP is its ability to reduce systemic risk through multilateral netting of exposures, the enforcement of robust risk management standards, and mutualization of losses resulting from clearing member failures." 80 Even Powell, despite his critical evaluation of CCPs, cites this constellation of practices as evidence of their superior risk management potential. 81 Taking these technologies one at a time reveals important similarities with the pre-crisis era, despite shifts in the actors who are performing these practices.
Netting, in a world of central clearing
CCPs' capacity for multilateral netting is frequently touted as one of the main advantages of central clearing. Rather than the pre-crisis norm of bilateral netting, which did not account for the interconnectedness of derivative dealers and users, as central nodes in financial networks, CCPs are, in theory, better able to "net out" transactions that implicate multiple counterparties.
The Bank of England's explanation is representative of how this advantage is explained: "CCPs can reduce counterparty credit risk by netting exposures across their members: that is, offsetting an amount due from a member on one transaction against an amount owed to that member on another, to reach a single, smaller net exposure […] The netting of payment obligations can also reduce the liquidity needs of members arising from those contractual obligations."
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Multilateral netting is thus taken as evidence of the superior ability of CCPs to limit credit risk, but there is good reason to be cautious of the extent to which multilateralized netting actually makes financial markets more stable. For example, Darrell Duffie and Haoxiang Zhu find that, "for plausible cases, adding a new CCP for a class of derivatives such as credit default swaps (CDS) reduces netting efficiency, increases collateral demands, and leads to a higher average exposure to counterparty default." 83 Using both modeling and illustrative evidence from 81 Powell, 2014 : "the intent is not simply to concentrate risk, but also to reduce it--through netting of positions, greater transparency, better and more uniform risk-management practices, and more comprehensive regulation." 82 Rehlon and Nixon, 2013: 2-4 . 83 Duffie and Zhu, 2011: 75. Gregory, 2015: 18. then be used, in conjunction with a default fund to which all members contribute, to cover any losses. Should those sources be exhausted, the CCP may have to draw on its own capital, followed by contributions to the default fund by non-defaulting clearing members. The "default waterfall" is intended to deal with counterparty default in an orderly, and ultimately, confined, go on to assert that, "CCPs set margin policies and requirements such that the probability of sums owed by a defaulting member to the CCP on its cleared positions exceeding the amount of margin held is very small," 88 Powell of the US Federal Reserve contends that it is precisely the possibility of such low-probability events that lead to questions about whether CCPs will actually be able to tamp down the contagion through which the 2008 crisis was spread:
During the global financial crisis, governments around the world took extraordinary actions to shore up many of the large financial institutions that are also large clearing members. While it is not possible to say with confidence what would have happened if these measures had not been taken, it is surely the case that whatever pressures CCPs faced would have been many times greater, and the potential consequences much greater as well. Moreover, as CCPs grow into their enhanced role in the financial system, they will represent an ever larger locus for 87 Rehlon and Nixon, 2013: 2. 88 Ibid.: 5.
systemic risk. It is therefore important not to be lulled into a false sense of security that past performance is a guarantee of future CCP success.
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Given the dramatic deviations from rating agencies' evaluations of default risk 90 and risk models' predictions of losses 91 during the financial crisis, we should be cautious of whether CCPs' margin calculations can account for unpredictable swings in asset prices, market liquidity, and counterparty default in a way that fundamentally alters the vulnerability of the financial system to such events. 92 Although there may now be more capital available to draw on, in the event of a counterparty default, the technologies for assigning that capital -and more fundamentally, the mitigation of risk through capital reserves (whether in the form of collateral, capital requirements, or default funds) -remains the same, as discussed in more detail below.
Risk management, in a world of central clearing
In addition to multilateral netting and collateralization, much of the positive rhetoric surrounding central clearing emphasizes "the enforcement of robust risk management Lockwood, 2015 . 97 E.g., by weighting volatilities, embedding stress testing, and using multiday "holding periods," rather than single trading days as observations --measures designed to better account for extreme tail events, though not without considerable criticism (e.g., Danielsson, 2013) . 98 Gregory, 2015: 19. 99 Hull, 2007 ; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013: "ES accounts for the tail risk in a more comprehensive manner [than VaR], considering both the size and likelihood of losses above a certain threshold" (18).
[A] typical calculation might require that initial margin is sufficient to cover the average of the worst 6 losses in the last two and a half thousand days (10 years).
[…] However, the problem with the thousands of days of market data changes that are analysed in order to define the initial margins is that on virtually none of them have any CCP members (i.e. banks) actually defaulted. Predicting the market volatility in the aftermath of a default event using data when defaults don't happen is dangerous. The worst six days in the above example are actually pretty much the only days of interests, given that at least some of these represent the last significant OTC default scenario (Lehman Brothers). However, taking the average is less than 'robust' and would imply significant probability of losses exceeding initial margin and spilling over into default fund.
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Gregory's criticism of CCPs' reliance on historical data in calculating initial margin was borne out in 2016 when the Brexit vote caused GBP swap rates to move by more than the initial margin required by both LCH and CME, the two major clearinghouses for currency swaps. 101 LCH and CME calibrated their risk models for setting margin requirements based on ten-year and eightyear-long historical periods, respectively, and neither period included a price movement on the scale of that produced by Brexit. Despite the use of tail loss scenarios, a measure meant to correct for both VaR's and Expected Shortfall's exclusion of very uncommon, very large possible losses, both CCPs' models failed to anticipate the amount of collateral that would be necessary to guard against the change in swap rate caused by an unexpected political event. 102 A 100 Gregory, 2015, 19. 101 Khwaja 2016. The author thanks Jon Gregory for directing her to this example. 102 Moreover, although Brexit has now been factored into the initial margin calculations for GBP swaps, it is not clear whether the possibility of a rate movement of that magnitude has affected the initial margin requirements of reliance on historical data is not the only problem of CCPs' risk models; Jon Danielsson is similarly skeptical that Expected Shortfall allows financial institutions to better risk that is endogenous to the financial system, including "the vicious feedback loops that are at the core of financial crises."
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Centrally cleared OTC derivative markets depend on the same core set of risk management practices that failed to limit counterparty, and ultimately systemic, risk during the global financial crisis. These practices were insufficient to control markets when it mattered most, and there is good reason to doubt whether their transfer to central clearinghouses has done enough to prevent another crisis in the future. In failing to recognize the inability of netting, collateralization, and risk modelling to fully account for market complexity and uncertainty, we also overlook the contribution of these practices to that instability, whether through engendering a false sense of security, counterperformativity, or the creation of highly correlated linkages among large financial institutions. We should not, therefore, be surprised that the central clearing requirement has reproduced many of the very dynamics it was intended to forestall. Although the shift from market self-regulation to a governmentally mandated clearing requirement can be interpreted as a fundamental shift in market governance, a closer look at the practices that structure central clearing reveals continuity, rather than change.
It is possible to interpret this outcome as a failure of imagination, in which more radical structural reforms were passed over in favor of modifying existing technologies. A full consideration of why regulatory thinking was so constrained is beyond the scope of this paper.
other currency swaps, raising further questions about the generalizability and limitations of the historical data used to calibrate these risk models. 103 Danielsson, 2013. Nonetheless, the continued acceptance of OTC derivatives markets as legitimate forms of economic exchange surely plays an important role. As long as these markets exist, netting, collateralization, and risk models are likely to play important roles, given the ways in which these practices structure the daily operations of the market. Far from being regulations imposed on the market by public regulators worried about risk, these practices were first developed by the industry itself, then cited by public regulators as evidence of the capacity for self-regulation.
Implementing regulation that departed dramatically from these technologies would likely mean a restructuring of the OTC market that would likely leave it unrecognizable or perhaps even nonexistent. Having legitimized these practices in the era of self-regulation, policymakers enabled the creation of a hundred-trillion dollar market that was, in part, constituted by them. In not (successfully) disputing the OTC market's right to exist following the crisis, policymakers were limited to regulatory tools that would allow the market to remain profitable. We should not be surprised, then, that central clearing has reproduced so many of the dynamics associated with the OTC market prior to 2008.
Conclusion
Given the relative newness of the central clearing requirement, this analysis is necessarily preliminary. But while this novelty represents a potential disadvantage in terms of data collection, it also provides scholars of global political economy with valuable "real time" insight into how markets are constituted and reconstituted -a perspective that is often missing in our analyses of the lead-up to the financial crisis, many of which are retrospective. Accordingly, this chapter is more empirical than theoretical in bent, and my arguments about the limitations of central clearing and the sources of those limitations in pre-crisis narratives and assumptions about how markets can and should be governed are, of necessity, provisional ones.
Nonetheless, the case of central clearing contributes to an answer to two of the empirical questions that motivate this volume: Why, given the severity of the crisis, have regulatory responses been relatively constrained? And why has post-crisis regulation produced fragmentation where we might expect to see coordination and cooperation? In answer to the first question, the crisis did not put an end to the longstanding regulatory tradition of deferring to market practices. Private clearinghouses were already a part of the financial landscape, albeit a much smaller one, and mandated clearing was tolerated -and in some cases even endorsed -by actors within the financial industry following the crisis. The transnational policy community of national and international regulators, market participants, and industry organizations that encouraged self-regulation in the derivatives industry prior to the crisis were quick to push for central clearing to be included on the influential G-20 agenda in 2009. The handful of more radical reforms that were floated during the height of the crisis -especially those, such as banning unattached CDS and requiring exchange trading of all OTC derivatives, that would have rendered the OTC market unrecognizable, if not ended it entirely -were quickly abandoned in favor of a more market-friendly regulatory regime that relied on a familiar set of risk management practices. This continuity speaks to the influence of the financial industry, but it also reflects the limits of possible regulatory change once public authorities have determined that a particular market should (continue to) exist.
While continuity at the level of practices is explained, at least partially, by transnational dynamics, many of the unexpected, potentially destabilizing consequences of mandated central clearing are evidence of the salience of national regulatory actors post-crisis. While we have seen international consensus around broad regulatory changes, accompanied by more detailed regulatory principles published by transnational actors like IOSCO and CPMI, public regulation must ultimately be implemented and enforced at the national (or supranational, in the case of the EU) level. Cross-border disputes over recognition and regulatory harmonization have produced regulatory, and in turn, market fragmentation, undermining CCPs' capacity to most effectively mitigate systemic risk. Moreover, as market pressures reduce the number of clearinghouses in each jurisdiction, the debate over the appropriate relationship between public finances and private firms that are "too big to fail" has been re-opened. Despite initial optimism about the ability of publically mandated central clearing to transform the global financial landscape, thus far, the topology appears worryingly familiar.
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